PUBLICATIONS
Delegation, Collaborative Governance, and Non-Distributive Policy: The Curious Case of Joint Partnerships in American Federalism, with Anthony Michael Bertelli, Giulia Leila Travaglini, Pamela J. Clouser McCann. The Journal of Politics, vol. 81(1), 2019, pp. 377-384.
Abstract: Although Congress often uses grants and other fiscal incentives when delegating policy to the states, it also incorporates nonfiscal arrangements, or joint partnerships, into legislation. These partnerships include joint state-federal oversight boards, intergovernmental task forces, as well as other nondistributive programs and services. We examine the conditions under which Congress chooses to increase joint partnerships in a formal model of intergovernmental delegation and test the implications of the model on federal laws from 1973 to 2010. We argue with evidence that Congress may rely on collaborative nonfiscal partnerships with states and localities when technical uncertainty increases but is less likely to do so when political uncertainty rises. Our theory extends existing models of delegation to provide an important step toward a broader theory of legislatively designed collaborative governance
The Impact of Capital Requirements on Bank Capital, with Ugo Albertazzi, Aurea Ponte Marques, and Aurora Abbondanza. European Centeral Bank Working Paper Series, 2025.
Abstract: This paper presents the first causal evidence on how banks adjust their voluntary capital buffers (the capital headroom above the required level) in response to changes in capital requirements. Using granular euro area data and exploiting the threshold-based assignment of Other Systemically Important Institution (O-SII) buffers within a regression discontinuity design, we study the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, complementing the asset-focused literature on lending and risk-taking. This allows us to assess whether capital regulation is effective in enhancing bank resilience, arguably its main objective. We find that banks offset about half of higher capital requirements by cutting their voluntary buffers rather than raising new equity. The offsetting effect is more pronounced among banks with weaker balance sheets, particularly those with higher levels of non-performing loans. These results indicate that regulation aimed at strengthening resilience may be only partially effective, as banks use existing voluntary buffers when subject to higher requirements.
DISSERTATION PROJECT: Policymaking in the Corporate Energy Transition
My dissertation examines how public and quasi-public organizations respond to climate and economic shocks, and how these crises reshape management strategy, leadership behavior, and policy design. I assembled and hand-coded an original dataset on lobbying and policy advocacy around energy and environmental bills. (1) My Job Market Paper shows that natural disasters can shift managerial attitudes toward sustainable investment and risk mitigation, but that institutional constraints and political context often translate these shifts into ambiguous or delayed policy responses. (3) A second paper analyzes how organizational ownership and governance structures—public, cooperative, or private—shape responsiveness to crises and equity outcomes. (3) My third paper regards my research agenda on Green Jobs and Policy Feedback and the Green New Deal. I shows with a survey experiment how companies’ tax credits for employment-focused climate policies reshape attitudes, coalitions, and the durability of reforms.
Project 1 - Job Market Paper:
When Nature Roars: Managerial and Corporate Political Activity.
Abstract: This paper examines how managers’ political preferences shape corporate political behavior in the United States-specifically lobbying and campaign contributions on environmental policy. I argue that directly experiencing major natural disasters heightens the perceived immediacy of climate risk, lowering managers’ contributions to Republicans. However, this does not translate into overt pro-clean-energy advocacy; instead, fossil-fuel firms headquartered in Democratic-leaning areas hit by disasters tend to mask opposition, undermining environmental justice. First, using a Hurricane Sandy case study, I document a decline in the Republican share of managers’ federal campaign contributions in 2013 in affected counties relative to the prior decade. Second, drawing on a novel dataset, I show that, following local major disasters, fossil-fuel-dependent firms headquartered in Democratic-leaning areas across the USA shift toward ambiguous Undecided lobbying positions on energy and environmental legislation in Iowa and Wisconsin (2009-2016). Together, the results suggest that post-disaster belief updates among managers lead to more cautious non-market strategies rather than overt policy endorsement, with implications for the politics of environmental justice and communities.
Presented:
- Climate Pipeline Project, 2025.
- Panel Disaster, Policy Windows, and Environmental Action. Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) Annual Conference 2023.
- American Political Science Association (APSA) 2024.
- American Political Science Association (APSA) 2023.
- Decarbonization, Climate Resilience and Climate Justice Conference (DCRCJ) 2023.
Grants:
- Center for Political Economy, Columbia University.
Project 2:
Public and Private Ownership Utilities.
Abstract: I analyze how the ownership structure of public utilities conditions responsiveness to the energy transition, particularly after major disasters. I developed a theory based on exploratory interviews with managers in publicly owned utilities. I decided to examine renewable energy and efficiency investments for public vs. private ownership (with EIA data).
Project 3:
The Policy Feedback of the IRA Renewable Energy provisions.
Abstract: This paper examines whether information about the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)’s clean energy provisions affects public support for renewable energy policies. In a pilot survey experiment I conducted, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three treatments: (1) a general description of the clean energy provisions of the IRA, (2) a jobs-focused framing, or (3) a message about the IRA’s potential repeal. A control group received no information. Preliminary results suggest that respondents exposed to any treatment express lower support for expanding the IRA, particularly Republicans. Although most acknowledge that the IRA creates jobs, this does not lead them to view the policy as beneficial for their communities and decreases support for green energy policies. On the other hand, unemployed respondents and respondents who did not know about the IRA have higher preferences for expanding the IRA. I also examine a quasi-natural experiment embedded in the survey experiment comparing “Energy Communities”—areas receiving IRA funding—with similar areas that do not. Support for the IRA, especially among Republicans, suggesting that direct material exposure may increase support. While the study is underpowered to detect small effects, if confirmed, this would support policy feedback theories, even for indirect and politically polarizing policies: tangible program benefits can shift attitudes, even when initial reactions to the policy are negative, while informational framing can shape public opinion in unexpected ways.
Presented:
Presented:
Grants:
- Columbia Experimental Laboratory for Social Sciences (CELSS), Columbia University.
- Center for Political Economy, Columbia University.
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CAPE Summer Academy 2025
OTHER WORKING PAPERS
Delegation and Devolution After Brexit: A Revised Theory of Intergovernmental Policymaking Anthony Michael Bertelli and Nicola Palma.
Abstract: British institutions allow the central government to make the key choices regarding the devolution of EU powers, but what incentives does it face when choosing whether to centralize or devolve authority post-Brexit? We offer a formal theory of the delegation and devolution of powers under both "hard" and "soft" Brexit scenarios that produces four main findings. First, when structural independence is less effective in reducing policy drift and incentivizing expertise for both European and territorial agents, hard Brexit yields more devolved policy-making. Second, however, the extent to which structural independence decreases policy drift and capacity acquisition does not influence the devolution choice of the central government. Third, if Westminster does not see a clear difference in the effect of independence on drift or expertise in the European or regional agencies, territorial agencies will enjoy at least as much independence as they did pre-Brexit. Fourth, a soft Brexit will lead to a decrease in devolution and structural independence compared with pre-Brexit levels. We also argue that technical policies will experience more devolved authority, while ideological policies will be more centralized.
Abstract: British institutions allow the central government to make the key choices regarding the devolution of EU powers, but what incentives does it face when choosing whether to centralize or devolve authority post-Brexit? We offer a formal theory of the delegation and devolution of powers under both "hard" and "soft" Brexit scenarios that produces four main findings. First, when structural independence is less effective in reducing policy drift and incentivizing expertise for both European and territorial agents, hard Brexit yields more devolved policy-making. Second, however, the extent to which structural independence decreases policy drift and capacity acquisition does not influence the devolution choice of the central government. Third, if Westminster does not see a clear difference in the effect of independence on drift or expertise in the European or regional agencies, territorial agencies will enjoy at least as much independence as they did pre-Brexit. Fourth, a soft Brexit will lead to a decrease in devolution and structural independence compared with pre-Brexit levels. We also argue that technical policies will experience more devolved authority, while ideological policies will be more centralized.
Trade and Attitudes Toward Globalization: The Mexico Case Study.
Abstract: My research question focuses on how gain and losses from trade are under- stood economically or culturally and how do they influence the opposition to and support of globalization and populism. In particular, on one side, an increase in imports causes an increase in competition that results in concentrated costs (and dispersed benefits) in Europe and in the USA that lead to populism in the last years. How and why does the presence of both concentrated costs and bene- fits lead to populism and dislike for globalization and populism in countries that increase their export thanks to globalization? I collected qualitative evidence through interviews and quantitative causal evidence showing that an increase in export decreases individuals nationalism, preferences for autarchy and economic conservatism but does not impact internationalism. I conducted semi-structured interviews to enquire my theory in 4 case studies (Chiapas, Mexico City, Gua- najuato/Queretaro and Ensenada) in Mexico. From a quantiative point of view I constructed a panel dataset with labor sectorial data and export (and import) data by sector between Mexico and the US. Using Autor and Dorn (2016)’s "trade shock" and instrument it to deal with reverse causation. I find that the increased export influences political preferences: it decreases nationalism, autarchy and economic conservatism, but doesn’t affect preferences for internationalism due to high labor mobility in Mexico.
Presented:
Abstract: My research question focuses on how gain and losses from trade are under- stood economically or culturally and how do they influence the opposition to and support of globalization and populism. In particular, on one side, an increase in imports causes an increase in competition that results in concentrated costs (and dispersed benefits) in Europe and in the USA that lead to populism in the last years. How and why does the presence of both concentrated costs and bene- fits lead to populism and dislike for globalization and populism in countries that increase their export thanks to globalization? I collected qualitative evidence through interviews and quantitative causal evidence showing that an increase in export decreases individuals nationalism, preferences for autarchy and economic conservatism but does not impact internationalism. I conducted semi-structured interviews to enquire my theory in 4 case studies (Chiapas, Mexico City, Gua- najuato/Queretaro and Ensenada) in Mexico. From a quantiative point of view I constructed a panel dataset with labor sectorial data and export (and import) data by sector between Mexico and the US. Using Autor and Dorn (2016)’s "trade shock" and instrument it to deal with reverse causation. I find that the increased export influences political preferences: it decreases nationalism, autarchy and economic conservatism, but doesn’t affect preferences for internationalism due to high labor mobility in Mexico.
Presented:
- Quantitative Political Economy Workshop, Kings College.
Grant:
- Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) Pre-dissertation Field Research Travel Grant Fellowship. Institute for Human Studies (IHS).
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Ensenada PRI Office
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Ensenada Factory
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Chiapas Line for Public Subsidies
Local News Media and Political Participation: France, with Alberto Mola.
Abstract: France held the first turn of municipal elections on 15/03/2020, at the time when Covid-19 virus had reached only some departments and with different intensities. Exploiting the exogeneity of temporal and geographical variation in the spread of Covid-19 we identify the effects of virus’ fear on the elections. With a difference in differences approach, we show that the number of Covid-19 cases in a department has a negative effect on turnout also when controlling for pre-trends, moreover we find evidence of a significant effect on the political outcome, namely a shift towards platforms that mention the need for "strong and stable governments" or that "appeal to national solidarity".In addition, we study Covid-19 fear transmission channels, in particular we look at the effect of the exposure to Covid-19 related content in the local newspapers that we measure with an index based on text analysis of the first pages in the weeks before the elections. We found that exposure to Covid-19 news affects both turnout and political outcome, however, the effect is stronger when news refers to government restrictions in response to the pandemic such as forced school closure. We also found that within the same district distance from municipalities where schools were closed is correlated with changes in voting behavior, confirming the policy as a possible relevant channel in perception of Covid-19 threat.
Presented:
Abstract: France held the first turn of municipal elections on 15/03/2020, at the time when Covid-19 virus had reached only some departments and with different intensities. Exploiting the exogeneity of temporal and geographical variation in the spread of Covid-19 we identify the effects of virus’ fear on the elections. With a difference in differences approach, we show that the number of Covid-19 cases in a department has a negative effect on turnout also when controlling for pre-trends, moreover we find evidence of a significant effect on the political outcome, namely a shift towards platforms that mention the need for "strong and stable governments" or that "appeal to national solidarity".In addition, we study Covid-19 fear transmission channels, in particular we look at the effect of the exposure to Covid-19 related content in the local newspapers that we measure with an index based on text analysis of the first pages in the weeks before the elections. We found that exposure to Covid-19 news affects both turnout and political outcome, however, the effect is stronger when news refers to government restrictions in response to the pandemic such as forced school closure. We also found that within the same district distance from municipalities where schools were closed is correlated with changes in voting behavior, confirming the policy as a possible relevant channel in perception of Covid-19 threat.
Presented: